INTRODUCTION

On 9 August 2017, the Spanish media reported a crisis caused by eggs contaminated with the insecticide fipronil, a product banned for disinsecting poultry, but permitted for cats and dogs. This crisis affected production in 17 European countries, mainly the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.

Although only two batches were withdrawn in Spain (20,000 units of liquid egg in Bizkaia and 50 kilos of powdered egg in Catalonia), the scandal caused millions in losses for the poultry farmers affected, as well as causing a crisis of confidence among producers and consumers in a large part of Europe. In fact, it led to a new food crisis, accentuated by miscommunication between partners and the desire on the part of all to avoid a repetition of such cases. This desire prompted a meeting of EU ministers involved in the food crisis promoted by the European Commission on 26 September 2017.

The meeting recalled another food crisis with similar protagonists, the one caused on 24 May 2011 by the E.coli bacteria, in which 4,321 people were affected and 50 died. Although there were no fatalities in the egg crisis, it does seem appropriate to analyse the role played in the management of each of the crises by the corresponding European authorities, as well as the media, since in both cases the communicative actions directly influenced the image of the EU as a guarantor of control of the management of food crises, which includes communication policies (Aranceta, 2016, p.12).

It is worth remembering that if there is one element capable of breaking the harmony between European partners, it is food, specifically, spoiled food sold to a neighbour. When this happens, countries are outraged as if they were customers returning to the restaurant where they have suffered food poisoning. In such situations, the politicians' tripadvisor is the media, a stage on which European ministers unceremoniously turn on each other. This is what happened in 2011 when Germany accused Spain of selling spoiled cucumbers, an accusation it retracted a few days later. In the case of contaminated eggs, the accusations have focused on poor communication in the form of delays in warning about the presence of contaminated eggs in Central European farms. The reproaches have been manifold: Germany against Belgium, Belgium against the Netherlands and France against the entire European control system.

It should be borne in mind that the European food control system is governed by a rapid alert tool shared by the Member States, the RASFF (Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed) created in 1979, so that when a member of the network has information concerning the existence of a serious risk to human health deriving from food or feed, it must immediately notify this information to the Commission via the rapid alert system.

In addition to the RASFF, the heads of the EU's national food agencies produced a report in 2014 which stated that one of the basic priorities in the management of a food crisis was to have protocols in place to take action and ensure good management. While experts say that no one can guarantee zero risk in food, there are many factors that are controlled through food regulations. Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 lays down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures relating to food safety. It also highlights the role of the EFSA (European Food Safety Authority), and in the case of Spain, the AECOSAN (Spanish Agency for Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and Nutrition), established by Royal Decree 19/2014 of 17 January, which has various communication tools at its disposal.

OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

METHODOLOGY

This text analyses the type of information related to the egg crisis offered throughout 2017 by five digital newspapers: elpais.com, abc.es, lavanguardia.com, elconfidencial.com and eldiario.es. According to ComScore data (Table 1), these five publications were among the top 10 cyber-dailies with the highest readership in Spain in November 2017. Three of these publications are the online version of print newspapers - El País, La Vanguardia and Abc, while elconfidencial.com and eldiario.es fall into what are known as "digital natives", i.e. products created specifically for the Internet.

Source : ComScore

The method chosen to develop this research has been Content Analysis, and as part of it we have found answers to most of the considerations formulated at the beginning of this study through qualitative analysis, for which we have followed the guidelines set out by Bardin (1996).

For the study of the sample, a double examination has been carried out - quantitative and non-quantitative - based on the proposals made on content analysis by authors such as Walitzer and Wienir (1978), Krippendorff (1990) and the aforementioned Bardin (1996), who explains that "the quantitative approach is based on the frequency of appearance of certain elements of the message", while "the non-quantitative approach resorts to non-frequential indicators which allow inference" (Bardin, 1996: 87).

On the one hand, information related to the egg crisis and fipronil - from 2 August to 22 August 2017 - published in the five media mentioned above, as well as those related to the E.coli bacteria - from 22 May to 31 May 2011 - were collected. In the latter case, the conclusions of other studies on the cucumber crisis have also been studied, such as those of Pujol and Gallemí (2012), V Gestal and Souto (2014), and López Villafranca (2013). The media investigated by the latter were El País, El Mundo and ABC.

From this information, all the statements collected by the reference media were studied and classified according to the different sources: institutional, political, international, health, environmental, etc. A categorisation sheet was also drawn up to classify the different communicative actions according to the sources.

Based on their analysis, 141 statements published in the media were studied, obtained through the following communicative actions: press releases, press conferences, interviews, public appearances in the governing bodies of the different countries affected by the crisis and television programmes. These statements are mainly present in elpais.com, lavanguardia.com and abc.es.

Finally, the communication policies carried out in each of the cases have been specified and evaluated to determine the effectiveness of each one of them.

The recommendations of experts such as Wesphalen and Piñuel (1992), O Ogrizek, Guillery, and J (1996), Piñuel (1997), González Herrero and A (1998), Rodríguez and Sádaba (1999), Fita (1999), Bell Mallen (2004), Fearn-Banks (2007), Alcat (2008),Quesada (2016) and Fink (2013), among others, we have ordered (Figure 2) what we consider to be the most successful communication strategies and, therefore, recommended when managing a food crisis.

Source: Westphalen y Piñuel (1992), Ogrizek y Guillery (1996), Piñuel (1997), González Herrero and A (1998), Rodríguez y Sádaba (1999), Fita (1999), Bell Mallen (2004), Fearn-Banks (2007), Alcat (2008),Quesada (2016) o Fink (2013). Elaboración propia.

DISCUSSION

ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

In accordance with the objectives and hypotheses set out, we proceed to show the different results obtained.

DETERMINATION OF THE COMMUNICATION POLICY

After analysing the different strategies carried out by public institutions, governments, ministers, food safety agencies and other bodies such as the WHO, in accordance with the different communication actions, it can be concluded that in the case of the E.coli bacteria, Spain followed a reactive communication policy more focused on defending itself against accusations than on providing its own information that would attract the attention of the media and the general public. Germany, however, brought together in its proactive communication policy all the elements to make it successful: single spokesperson, Hamburg Senator Cornelia Prüfer-Storcks; single message, Spanish cucumbers are to blame; treatment of the media as allies; and headlines that were not negative for Germany.

With regard to the eggs, it could be said that from the statements of political and health officials analysed, it is clear that, with the exception of Spain, those involved followed a reactive communication policy based on keeping the population uninformed and on the confusion of messages focused on showing that everyone was innocent. Spain opted for transparency and information control as soon as the alarm was triggered, features of the proactive communication policy.

CONCLUSIONS

1.- The succession of cascading crises experienced in the case of the E.coli bacteria: food and health at first, then political and institutional, and finally economic as a result of mismanagement, is not seen in the case of the fipronil pesticide poisoning of eggs. In the latter, the crisis is mainly a food crisis, although there are communication problems between the political representatives of the affected countries that could have led to another political/institutional crisis similar to the one that occurred in 2011 with the E.coli bacteria, as some of the most serious errors were repeated. Thus, the egg scandal once again shows that, both at EU and national level, the primary basis of the food safety system is the rapid exchange of information between the authorities of the different countries. However, this did not take place between Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, leaving the EU to manage the crisis, a responsibility it never acknowledged as such. From all this it can be deduced that the European warning system continues to be questioned, even though it worked in Spain.

2.- The role of the EU in the face of non-compliance with the communication on food alerts is poorly defined, since in the face of the poor management of the bacterial crisis, its participation was focused solely on convening a meeting of all the member countries to guarantee greater food safety in the future, with the commitment to carry out the protocols approved therein. In the case of cucumbers, the EU limited itself to opening an investigation into whether the Belgian authorities were late in reporting, a report that was not made public.

The communication policy of the Spanish authorities in the bacteriological outbreak was based on a late reaction based on the denial of guilt and the defence of the Spanish product. To this end, the communication actions took the form of press releases and public appearances. This reactive communication policy succeeded in convincing the Spanish population and the political opposition in Spain, but not the international horticultural market. In the case of eggs, Spain opted for a proactive communication policy, anticipating any accusations and showing transparency, coherence in the message and control of the crisis. This was not the case with the European authorities, who showed a reactive strategy, centred on blaming each other, not taking responsibility and lying.

4.- For all these reasons, it can be stressed that since the cucumber crisis, controls and the warning system have been reinforced, but that this reinforcement is insufficient, as the lack of communication between states continues to be a fact with serious consequences for the health and economy of the countries affected. The article's main contribution is that the analysis focuses not on company communication, but on the communicative work of institutions. It is a new contribution to a field, that of institutional crisis communication, whose relevance and study are more relevant today than ever.

REFERENCES